1. Introduction. The main theme of this paper is that Nash Equilibria (N.E.) of games with smooth payoff functions are generally Pareto-inefficient.
Suppose that a strategic game with n players is given by n maps can be strenthened to: if an N.E. is strong every player is using a pure strategy.
That the outcome of noncooperation (N.E.) is generally incompatible with cooperation (efficiency) has been part of the "folklore" of Game Theory as exemplified in the paradigm of the "Prisoner's ~ilemma". The purpose of the paper is to put this on a rigorous footing.
This paper is a rewrite of an old version [2] . It is a pleasure to thank J.3. Rogawski for several comments, and in particular for the example in section 3, which is due in its entirety to him.
2.
The Main Theorem i k(i)
Let N = {l , .. . , n) , n 2 2 , be the set of players, and S C R 9 i k(i) 2 1 , the strategy-set of player i . Here S is the unit simplex,
i.e., S = {x e R, We define two subsets of RnXr (n) that help in the analysis of N(u) , There is an open, dense set u~ of (u)" such that, if u UM , 1 n then DU is transverse to M at every x in 1 = -V x...x V .
-(*) will follow from the Transveral Density and Openness Theorems (see
Appendix) if we can show:
( * D is tranverse to M at every x V .
Let y be an arbitrary vector in RnXr(") and consider any 1 
A discrete set. Then S n Dil (N ) must be finite since S is compact. Q.E.D.
Remarks
(1) We took strategy-sets to be simplices because they occur for many classes of games (see, e.g., [4] , [6] that have traditionally been i examined. But, in general, the S could be a finite union of submanifolds of some Euclidean space (contained in a compact region).
The theorem clearly holds.
(A vertex would now mean a zero-dimensional piece in this union, when the union is expressed minimally.)
(2) Define a function u : S -R to be c2 if it can be extended to a C* function on some neighborhood of S . Let -O be the space of 2 all C functions on S endowed with the norm It is more natural to consider (u)~ , rather than (u)" , to be the space of games. However, our theorem holds for (I)~ also. For any u 6 (u)" let u be the member of (gin obtained by restricting u from V to S . First note that
Also, it is well known that--if the si are nice" sets, e.g., simplices, spheres--(v) There exists a K > 0 such that: for any -u (LJn with lll?lls < E , we can find a u E (u)" with lluil < K E and ur = -u .
By (iv) and (v), if
Uo is open dense in (u)~ , then so is 
An Example
We present the following example because it is particularly simple and illustrates all of the features of the general case. U is a submanifold of C (R ) and is isomorphic as amanifold to R~ itself.
We want to examine that the Nash and efficient sets of the games where each player's payoff function is selected from U . A game of this type is determined by assigning a point P = (a,b) to player 1 and a point Q = (c,d) to player 2, so that their payoff functions are respectively up and U~ . We denote this game to be (P,Q) .
To find the Nash equilibria of the game (P,Q) , In the figure on the left, the point (091) R is the Nash equilibrium of the game (P,Q) . In particular, we see that every game (P,Q) has a unique Nash equilibrium.
To describe the efficient set of the game (P,Q) , denoted by E(P,Q) , we need a definition. Given any closed convex set C 5 R 2 and a point M E R~ , there is a unique closest point to M in C . We denote this point by rC(M) and call it the retraction of M into C . Lemma 1: For all P, Q 6 R , E(P,Q) is equal to the retraction into X of the line segment joining P and Q . In other words, if L(P,Q) is the line segment joining P and Q , then E(P,Q) = rX(L(P,Q)) .
Proof: We leave this as a simple exercise for the reader. Note that for all x X , a point y is a Pareto improvement on x if y lies on the perpendicular drawn from x to the line through P and Q .
Examples:
(i) if P and Q both lie in X , then E(P,Q) is L(P,Q) .
(0,1)
(ii) if P and Q lie outside of X , then E(P,Q) may look like the following (the bold line is E (P, Q) ) :
In the examples (i) and (ii), the point R is the unique Nash equilibrium and in both cases it is inefficient.
Lemma 2: Let R be the Nash equilibrium of the game (P,Q) where and (PI', Q") , with Nash equilibria R , R1 , and R" respectively.
In these three cases, the Nash equilibrium is efficient and the Nash equilibria of all nearby games remain efficient. In all three cases, at least one player is at a vertex and in the game (PI, Q1) , the efficient set is reduced to a point.
Proof: This is easy to check using Lema 1.
This example illustrates the following main points of the general theorem:
Nash equilibria are finite in number and vary continuously in u .
(ii) Efficient Nash equilibria at which no player is on a vertex of his s trategy-set are not robust.
(iii) Robust examples exist of efficient Nash equilibria where at least one player is on a vertex of his strategy-set.
Note that the submanifold of functions U satisfies condition (T.C.)*, as is easily checked, and hence the above results are a consequence of the theorem plus remark (3).
Mu1 ti-ma trix Games
These were introduced by Nash in [4] . Each player i has a finite set Ki of "pure strategiesff which we number for convenience as follows:
Each Ki is now enlarged to a set Xi of "mixed strategiesff, which are simply probability distributions on Ki :
Ki ={xeR
: C x.=l,x >o}. , . . . , j n . Then i if a E R~ is the payoff of i in the pure-strategy game, ' i restricted a to X gives his payoff in its "mixed extension."
To apply the Theorem to this context it will suffice to check that
where i is such that j e Ki .
i+l n (Since L is a disjoint union, this is well-defined.) Also for any Consider a strategy-to-outcome map Q : S -Y , with player i's i i utility u defined on P , and his payoff given by u (@(s)) , (i=l ,..., n).
(Our theorem focused on the special case when @ is the identity map.)
If dim S = dim Y and @ has full rank, then it is clear that our theorem continues to hold by the same proof. However, if dim S > dim Y then N(u) will no longer be a finite set for generic u , but instead a finite union of submanifolds of positive codimension in S . Thus N(u) will not "miss" the efficient set E(u) . But it seems probable that (for a generic choice of u -and @ ) the two sets N(u) and E(u) will have transversal intersection. Therefore the efficient N.E. will constitute submanifolds of positive codimension within the N.E. manifolds, and the general feature of inefficiency of N.E. will still be maintained. We have not worked out the details of this picture.
APPENDIX
We recall the results used in this paper.
1
"Let X and Y be C1 manifolds, f : X -Y a C map, and W C Y a submanifold. We say that f is transversal to W at a point x X , -- (1) X has finite dimension n and W has finite codimension (2) A and X are second countable; 
